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The Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program provides an income and health care 
safety net for the elderly poor.  The phenomenon of apparently eligible households that 
do not enroll in, or 'take up' SSI has been noted as a severe problem since the program's 
inception in 1974.  This paper examines SSI eligibility, applications, and participation in 
the aged population from 1984 (the most recent year analyzed in the literature to date) 
through 1997.   We are fortunate to have administrative data on SSI use that is linked to 
various panels of the SIPP.  We use this information to estimate the SSI-aged application 
choice.  The key findings from the earlier literature are sensitive with respect to exact 
sample specification, alternative approaches to imputing the expected SSI benefit, and 
more detailed information on application and receipt culled from administrative files.  
Our findings suggest that cash benefits may be less influential, and Medicaid access 













  Supplemental Security Income (SSI) is a means-tested program intended to enable 
elderly households with limited financial resources to live with dignity and independence in 
retirement.  SSI recipients may also be categorically eligible for another valuable benefit in 
Medicaid, which covers a wide range of health services.   
Since the program's inception in 1974, low participation rates have been an ongoing 
concern.  At any point in time, a substantial fraction of elderly households who appear 
financially qualified to receive SSI do not enroll.  In the parlance of the welfare literature, they 
fail to "take up" SSI.  Zedlewski and Meyer (1989) estimate that only about 30% of the elderly 
poor receive SSI benefits.  Take-up rates for the eligible population of elderly during the 
programs' first ten years are estimated at 50 to 55 percent.  McGarry (1996), in a major study of 
take-up, attributes this largely to the fact that many elderly poor expect to receive only a very 
modest cash payment.   
There are other signs that SSI may be under-used by the elderly.  For instance, the 
number of SSI-aged recipients has been falling over most of the program's history.  By 1998, 1.4 
million elderly people participated in SSI, down from 2.3 million in 1975.  To the extent that low 
participation of the elderly in SSI reflects serious unmet need, this is an issue of general public 
concern.  In an environment in which Social Security reform schemes promoting greater 
individual responsibility are proposed, it is important to better understand the effectiveness of a 
"safety net" program for households that are poorly positioned to reap the benefits of reform.   
Despite the fact that low SSI take-up by the elderly has been perceived as a serious 
problem for over a quarter of a century, there remains relatively little research on the aged and 
SSI.  This paper builds upon and extends earlier work in several ways.  The time period under 
consideration is expanded to encompass roughly the past 15 years' experience with SSI.  Access to the Social Security Administration's program records permits us to estimate the application 
decision, a true choice variable, in addition to participation, which is the net result of an 
application and an administrative process.  We use an alternative method of imputing expected 
SSI benefits for all sample units that demonstrably reduces measurement error in this key 
variable and is exogenous with respect to application choice.   
  The previous literature is badly out of date.  Aside from Yelowitz (2000), we have not 
discovered a serious analysis that considers SSI take-up after 1984.  Yet major changes to 
Medicaid and Medicare during the 1990s may have affected SSI take-up.  Yelowitz (2000) 
argues that the SSI-aged program would have grown dramatically (45 percent) over the 1990s 
were it not for alternative means of obtaining public health insurance.  The Social Security 
Administration (SSA) also conducted a major outreach effort to enroll more aged in SSI 
beginning in 1988.   
Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) panels constitute our data source.  A 
peculiar benefit of extending the SIPP time frame is that federal and state-only SSI participation 
are distinguished from each other in later panels, while early panels only track federal 
participation (many states offer supplements to the federal program benefit, and individuals may 
participate in the state component of the program only).  State-only participants receive very 
small cash benefits.  Ignoring state-only participants overstates the influence of the cash benefit 
amount on enrollment and may understate the importance of the value of Medicaid obtained 
through SSI participation and other factors.
1   
Administrative information on SSI application and payment status offers several advantages.  
There is evidence of underreporting of SSI income and recipiency in the SIPP (Roemer, 2000).  
                                                 
1 As of this writing, an analysis of the bias resulting from ignoring state-only participants is not 
yet incorporated.     
  1The administrative data contain the complete history of all activity regarding the SSI program for 
nearly all observations in the SIPP, including monthly applications, payment status, and payment 
amounts (all recorded on a monthly basis) since 1974.
2   
Analysis of SSI is also complicated by the fact that two distinct groups may enter the 
program.  For the aged, eligibility is a straightforward matter of meeting income and asset tests.  
The disabled who meet the means test may also receive an SSI benefit, but they must meet the 
same stringent disability standards as the Disability Insurance (DI) program.  Using information 
on individuals' exact ages and the timing of applications and payments, it is possible to 
distinguish true SSI-aged participants from those entering through the disability portion of the 
program.  The distinction is predicted to be important, as the process of entering SSI through 
disability is typically lengthy and complicated.  The populations of younger disabled and elderly 
may also differ significantly in their characteristics and motivations.  While SSI-aged 
participation rates have declined over the past 20 years, there have been large increases in 
disability program participation over the 1980s and 1990s, suggesting that the incentives to apply 
to the two portions of the program are markedly different.   
Information on applications is the most valuable contribution of the administrative data set.  
SSI participation, the only "outcome" variable available in the SIPP, is the net result of eligibility 
determination and application choice.  Factors that determine acceptance contingent upon 
application may well differ from factors that determine the decision unit's choice to apply in the 
first place.  Partly, this important issue appears to have been overlooked in the literature because 
of an implicit assumption that aged applicants are not often rejected.  Our data reveal that this is 
decidedly not the case.     
                                                 
2 It should also be possible to use the exact payment amounts from the administrative record in 
future work.    
  2Eligibility must be determined by the researcher by applying SSI rules as best he or she can 
to the available information on income and wealth from various sources.  Even when program 
and financial information are reasonably good (as might be claimed for the SIPP), errors will 
arise.  For example, it may be difficult for the researcher to detect irregular income that is 
disregarded under SSI program rules, leading to incorrect classification of some units as 
ineligible.  Alternatively, income may be overlooked or undercounted, leading to incorrect 
classification of units as SSI-eligible.  While the administrative data are not particularly helpful 
in furthering information on income,
3 they do provide additional information on measurement 
error on the part of the researcher.   
Without administrative information on applications, there is no way to distinguish units 
misclassified as eligible who apply for SSI and are rejected from eligible units that do not take up 
at all.  The important implication is that the true take-up rate could be understated by past 
studies.  If the researcher is better at classifying ineligible units (the past literature in fact 
assumes no errors in classifying ineligible units) then take-up rates exploiting administrative 
information, while still understated, will be closer to the true rate than the conventional measure 
is.  A final benefit of the administrative data is that while age is top coded in the SIPP at age 85, 
it is not top coded in administrative files.
4 
The administrative data have some important limitations.  Only information collected by the 
federal government for the purposes of administering its component of the program is available.  
Units living in states that administer the entire program themselves (a minority of cases), or 
receiving units that participate solely in the state portion of the program, will not appear.  A 
                                                 
3 Social security and SSI benefit information may be an exception.  As noted, we plan to explore 
the administrative benefit data in future work.   
4 By linking to the summary earnings record (social security) file, it is possible to recover actual 
ages for nearly all adult sample members, not just the few who link to the SSR file.   
  3second important caveat is the unusual way that the administering agency (Social Security) 
maintains the records.  The records reflect not the actual program history, but the program 
history as it should have been.  For example, if an applicant is initially rejected, but is later 
determined eligible (e.g., through adjudication), SSA rewrites the stream of payments (and 
payment statuses) as if the initial application had been immediately successful.  This introduces 
measurement error into variables relating to the timing of payment status, as well as payment 
amounts.  This problem should not affect application records and is presumably a less important 
empirical problem for non-disabled potential applicants who face a simple and quick process.   
The next section provides background information on the SSI program and outlines the basic 
economics of the application decision.  Section II reviews the literature.  Section III discusses the 
data sources and construction of samples and variables.  Section IV describes the methodology 
and presents the results of our replications of McGarry's (1996) findings with the 1984-1997 
SIPPs.  In section V, we describe our extensions and modifications and present our major 
empirical findings on participation.  Section VI presents our estimates of applications to the 
program, and estimates determinants of acceptance rates.  A discussion of the findings concludes 
the paper.   
 
I. The SSI Program and the Take-Up Decision 
The SSI program was begun in 1974 to provide a uniform federal safety net for the 
elderly and disabled, replacing state-dominated Old Age Assistance and Assistance to the Blind 
and Disabled (OAABD) programs.  Combined with Food Stamps, SSI is intended to raise an 
elderly household's resources to approximately the poverty line.  We are concerned with the 
component of the program intended for the impoverished elderly.   
  4The federal government sets eligibility criteria and maximum benefit levels for 
individuals and couples in the federal component of the program.  In addition, some states (those 
with more generous safety nets prior to 1974) were required, and other states chose, to 
supplement the basic federal benefit.  Other sources of retirement income influence both a 
household's eligibility for SSI and the size of their potential benefit.  Financial wealth also 
affects eligibility.  For example, as of 1985, individuals with over $1,600 in countable assets, and 
couples with over $2,400 in countable assets, were ineligible.
5   
Federal SSI benefits are a significant potential income source for the elderly poor, and 
state supplements can be substantial.  For example, in January 1991 the maximum monthly 
federal benefit was $407 for an individual and $610 for a couple.  At that time, the highest state 
benefit for couples was in California, where the maximum combined (federal+state) benefit was 
$630 for an individual and $1,167 for a couple.  In September 1989 the average federal payment 
to all elderly households on SSI was $163 and the average state supplement was $133; 49.6% of 
aged federal SSI recipients received a state supplement (1990 Green Book, p. 717).  While 
federal benefits are indexed for inflation, state benefits are not.   
The first $20 per month of unearned, non-transfer income, the first $65 of earned income, 
and one-half of all earnings exceeding $65, are disregarded in computing the SSI benefit.
6  
Income from private pensions, public pensions such as Social Security, interest income, and the 
like constitute unearned income.  Unearned income offsets SSI income dollar-for-dollar above 
                                                 
5 Kahn (1987) discusses the definition of countable assets, and McGarry (1996) provides more 
details regarding the SSI program rules. 
6In addition, certain home energy and support and maintenance assistance, Food Stamps, most 
federally-funded housing assistance, state assistance based on need, one-third of child support 
payments, and income received infrequently or irregularly are excluded.  Countable income is 
deducted first from the federal benefit.  If there is any excess income, it is deducted from the 
state supplemental payment level (Social Security Administration, 1994, pp. ii-iii).   
  5the first $20.  Means-tested transfer income, such as Veteran's Benefits, also offsets SSI income 
dollar-for-dollar, but none of it is disregarded.  The income disregards are not indexed for 
inflation, nor are they differentiated by household type (couple or individual).  In addition, in 
some states the disregard amounts vary from the federal levels.  The SSI benefit is determined by 
subtracting counted income from the maximum benefit, or benefit paid when there is no income 
(also called the "guarantee").  Note that it is possible to qualify for a state supplemental benefit 
without qualifying for a federal benefit (the state benefit is always paid out first).  This is "state-
only" SSI recipiency.          
  SSI recipients are required to apply for all other public benefits for which they may be 
eligible.  Aside from such public transfers, SSI-aged recipients rarely have other income.  In 
September 1993, e.g., 65% of aged SSI recipients also received a Social Security benefit; 22% 
had some other unearned income; while only 2.1% reported any earned income (1994 Green 
Book, p. 240, Table 6-16).  Fewer than 1% of SSI recipients reported private pension income 
(1994 Green Book, p. 240, Table 6-17). 
The Welfare Take-Up Decision 
  In a very simple model of welfare participation, a receiving unit takes up if expected cash 
benefits are positive.  The total benefit to "SSI participation" could be considerably larger than 
the cash benefit, however, if it provides a gateway to multiple programs.  For example, most SSI 
recipients are automatically enrolled in Medicaid, and often in Food Stamps as well.    
Nevertheless, people who appear program-eligible frequently fail to enroll.  A number of 
potential explanations for this seemingly non-optimal behavior have been proposed in the 
welfare literature, including stigma about being on welfare, transaction costs, and insufficient 
information about program parameters or the enrollment process.  In the cases of stigma and 
  6transaction costs, it is no longer sufficient that the expected benefit is positive; the benefit must 
be sufficiently large to outweigh these costs.  When information is a problem, one may observe 
nonparticipants who would have large imputed expected benefits but who are simply unaware of 
the program.  
Welfare stigma occurs when people incur psychic costs from participating in a means-
tested program.  This may be from fear of being socially ostracized, or because welfare 
recipiency is inconsistent with their self-image.  Moffitt (1983) finds evidence that welfare 
stigma discourages some mother-only families from enrolling in AFDC.  Since SSI is 
administered through the Social Security office like OAI, it may be that SSI is less stigmatizing 
than other welfare programs.  Unlike OAI recipients, however, SSI applicants and recipients 
must still document neediness and could find this process demeaning.   
Transaction costs may also play a role in nonparticipation.  Blank and Ruggles (1996) 
look at high-frequency data on Food Stamps and AFDC and find evidence that the transaction 
costs of getting on welfare do not merit take-up during short spells of eligibility.  The poverty 
status of most elderly is presumably more permanent, because it is less likely to reflect transitory 
fluctuations in earnings.  Even if the prospect of "cycling" on and off SSI may be less important, 
transaction costs may still discourage the first entry into SSI.   
Information may also play an important role in some cases.  It is possible that public 
awareness of the availability of SSI-aged is limited, and some individuals may confuse SSI with 
OASDI, since SSA administers both programs.  SSA has in fact mounted information campaigns 
to educate the public about the availability of SSI benefits.  If the SSI program is somewhat 
obscure, an important educational opportunity occurs when an individual visits the SSA office to 
arrange receipt of OAI. 
  7Beginning around 1990, potentially important changes in elderly access to Medicaid 
occurred through the QMB (Qualified Medicare Beneficiary) and SLMB (Select Medicare 
Beneficiary) options.  While the subject of the impact of health and health insurance on SSI use 
merits a separate analysis, we note that options to receive Medicaid apart from SSI participation 
increased in this era.  This implicitly reduces the relative value of SSI participation, and is 
therefore predicted to reduce applications and take-up.   
 
II.  Review of the Literature 
Several SSA publications have examined the characteristics of aged SSI recipients.  Scott 
(1991) uses a 1%-sample of Social Security earnings records to show that "periods of low wages, 
periods in noncovered employment, interruptions in employment, and periods of residence 
outside the United States" characterize many SSI-aged participants' life histories.  The 
determinants of SSI participation as a choice, however, remain little studied.   
Warlick (1982) is the first major study of SSI take-up.  The 1975 Current Population 
Survey (CPS) is used to examine eligibility and take-up in the first year of the program.  She 
finds a low take-up rate (only 50%) in the population identified as program-eligible.  For those 
who do take up, SSI has dramatic effects on household income.  On average, SSI roughly 
doubles the income of recipients and lifts 1 in 5 recipient households above the poverty line.  
Warlick identifies "factors of interest" in explaining take-up:  potential or expected SSI benefits, 
whether there is automatic Medicaid coverage under SSI in the state of residence, geographic 
region identifiers proxying for the generosity of state supplementation (due to a lack of state 
identifiers in her data, Warlick can only impute eligibility under federal SSI rules), sex, race, 
  8marital history, southern residence, residence outside a SMSA, OAI recipiency, age, and 
educational attainment.     
Estimating take-up in a population of nonworking, aged individuals simulated to be SSI-
eligible, Warlick finds a positive effect of benefit amounts, a negative effect of greater education 
(interpreted as a proxy for assets and/or measure welfare stigma), a positive effect of age, and a 
positive effect of rural and Southern residence (for most filing types).  Although Warlick finds 
that small potential benefits discourage take-up, she also computes that non-participation rates 
among the neediest eligibles (in terms of pre-SSI income) remain at a relatively high 20 percent.
7   
McGarry (1996) uses 1984 Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) data to 
identify potential SSI-eligibles and estimate the probability that they receive SSI.  Take-up for 
the sample of SSI-eligibles is specified as a function of household characteristics, the expected 
SSI benefit, other indicators of financial need, and variables indicating the value of Medicaid 
coverage through SSI.  The expected SSI benefit is determined by self-reported income and 
program parameters for the state of residence.  McGarry argues that measurement error in the 
expected SSI benefit amount is likely the most important estimation problem.  She proposes a 
two-stage procedure, in which the computed expected SSI benefit is first regressed on household 
characteristics and the (federal+ state) maximum benefit.  This fitted value then enters into a 
probit for the take-up decision.  If there is random measurement error in the expected SSI 
benefit, this results in an unbiased estimate of the effect of the expected SSI benefit on 
participation.  McGarry also corrects for error in the selection of the sample of "eligibles"--a 
problem when expected SSI benefits are computed with error--using a weighting procedure. 
                                                 
7 Using our data for 1984, we find a non-takeup-rate of 25% for the bottom 20% of the pre-SSI 
income distribution among eligibles, dropping to 20% in later sample years.     
  9McGarry's estimated take-up rate (around 55%) is similar to Warlick's rate for 1974.
8 
While the simple probit reveals a positive effect of the benefit on take-up, an instrumental 
variable approach doubles the magnitude of the expected benefit's coefficient.  The weighting 
procedure for potential misclassification has little influence on the findings.   
In instrumental variable approaches, the expected benefit is the only policy-amenable 
variable with a significant, expected effect.  Its elasticity is approximately 0.5.  No evidence is 
found that categorical Medicaid eligibility, income variability, or marital status influence take-up 
in expected ways.  Variables reflecting information costs (receipt of Social Security, education, 
and receipt of other welfare) do not have significant and/or expected effects on take-up, although 
receipt of other welfare (assumed to reflect stigma) has a positive effect on take-up.  McGarry 
concludes that estimating the model for years post-1984 should yield similar findings, since the 
two major factors that may change over time--awareness of the program and categorical 
Medicaid eligibility--are not influential.  Overall, the estimates provide little support for the 
notion that transaction costs or a lack of information helps explain low enrollment rates.  The 
chief explanation for low take-up in 1984 appears to be that many potential SSI-eligibles would 
qualify for only very modest cash payments.    
  Yelowitz (2000) revisits the role of medical insurance coverage on SSI take-up.  The 
effects of a policy change that extended coverage in the Qualified Medicare Beneficiary program 
are studied for a sample of Medicare-covered 66-75-year olds from the 1987 through 1992 
Current Population Surveys.  The impact of the QMB expansion on SSI-aged enrollment is 
estimated as a function of a "gain" variable that measures the difference in the income-eligibility 
limits of the SSI and QMB programs and other variables.  Yelowitz (2000) estimates that over 
                                                 
8 We follow McGarry (1996) in not applying SIPP population weights to our estimates.   
  10the 1987-1992 period, SSI-aged enrollment would have increased by 45% were it not for 
alternative routes to medical insurance for the elderly.   
The empirical specifications of McGarry (1996) and Yelowitz (2000) are quite different, 
making them difficult to compare directly.  Data periods and sources also differ.  Among 
important differences, the CPS appears to under-report SSI participation and SSI income more 
than the SIPP (Roemer, 2000).   
  Hill (1990) represents the only existing study that explicitly focuses on the issue of 
information.  Hill uses the 1980 PSID to examine the role of information costs, treating 
information acquisition as a choice.  In this year, elderly respondents identified by the surveyors 
as eligible for but not receiving SSI were asked both whether they thought they were eligible, 
and whether they had contacted anyone to find out.  The PSID also followed up with questions 
on benefit amounts to which these individuals believed they might be entitled.  Only one-eighth 
of the group of eligibles reported that although they believed themselves to be eligible, they had 
no interest in participating.  Hill interprets this as prima facie evidence against a substantial role 
for welfare stigma.  On the other hand, nearly one-third of predicted eligibles either believed 
themselves to be ineligible or had no idea if they were eligible.   
Hill uses the 1980 PSID to estimate a two-step model of information acquisition and SSI 
participation.  Based on a first-round guess as to eligibility, people decide whether to become 
informed about program specifics.  Those surpassing a threshold level will join the "informed 
regime."  Using the unique follow-up questions in the PSID, Hill jointly estimates the decision to 
become informed and to participate.  The benefit amount positively affects both outcomes.  A 
perception of low benefits short-circuits the take-up process by discouraging people from 
gathering information in the first place.  Hill's findings suggest that part of the effect of the 
  11expected benefit on participation in single-equation settings may reflect its impact on 
information acquisition.     
    
III.  Data   
Public-Use Data 
The Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), administered by the U.S. 
Census Bureau, collects detailed information on income, program use, and other characteristics 
at frequent intervals for a two-to-three-year period.  SIPP households are interviewed at four-
month intervals ("waves") about the activities of the previous four months.
9  In addition to the 
core survey administered every wave, topical modules on a wide variety of subjects, including 
health and assets, appear regularly.  The first, and one of the largest, SIPP panels was fielded in 
1984.  With the exceptions of 1994 and 1995, a new SIPP panel has entered the field every year 
since 1990.  Beginning with the 1996 survey, the overlapping panel structure has been 
abandoned, but the base survey has been enlarged.   
SSI policy parameters include the combined state-federal guarantee, the federal asset 
limits, and state and federal income allowances (disregards and implicit taxes).  These values 
may vary for couples and individuals, and can depend on whether the unit is living in their own 
household or the household of another.  After defining recipiency units and household type, the 
appropriate program parameters are assigned to each observation by state.   
Data from the Social Security Administration 
                                                 
9 Institutionalized individuals, who may be on SSI, will not appear in our sample.   
  12  Census Bureau personnel matched selected administrative files from SSA to the SIPP 
files using SIPP sample members’ social security numbers.
10  The resulting Supplemental 
Security Record (SSR) file contains the entire history of each sample member's interaction with 
the SSI office (applications, appeals, payments, etc...), along with basic information (e.g., date of 
birth) collected in the administration of the program.
11  Through the Summary Earnings Record 
(SER), one obtains every SIPP sample member's complete history of Social Security covered 
employment and earnings (from 1954).
12   
Sample Construction 
The 1984, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, and 1996 files have been matched to SSI 
administrative files and all are used in this project.
 13  Due to the overlapping structure of the 
SIPP panels, estimation is carried out for the calendar years 1984, 1991, 1993, 1995, and 1997.   
Table 1 lists the deletions and reorganization leading to the final samples.  The first line 
lists the counts for individuals in the SIPP either over age 64 or married to someone 65 or older.  
From this group, we drop individuals in households without unique state-identifying information 
(nearly 10% of all observations).  We then redefine the level of observation to be a receiving unit 
(couple or individual).  Next, we drop all units that were not interviewed every wave in the prior 
calendar year, with missing health information, and with person weights of zero (indicating 
noninterview).  The final data set has more than 25,000 units.   
                                                 
10 The Social Security numbers are mapped into unique observation identifiers assigned in the SIPP.  The 
Social Security number is never revealed to the researcher.     
11 Recently, the RAND Corporation produced a codebook of these files for SSA (Panis, et al., 2000).   
12 Access to the administrative data in any form is highly restricted.  The data are physically 
accessed at a secure work site, and the researcher must have special sworn status from the 
Census Bureau.  The data were accessed at the Washington, D.C. office of SSA, with 
arrangements facilitated by the Office of Research, Evaluation, and Statistics.   
13 It is unfortunate that SIPPs from the mid-to-late 1980s have not been matched.  In the future, we may 
be able to incorporate information on Social Security eligibility status and benefit amounts from the 
Supplemental Earnings Record (SER) and Master Beneficiary Record (MBR) files.   
  13Units identified as financially eligible for SSI often form the estimation samples.  If all 
income sources are considered, there are slightly over 3,100 eligible units (note that we follow 
McGarry in always classifying units with assets above the limit and more than one vehicle as 
ineligibles).  Sex and family structure are highly correlated with eligibility.  Over two-thirds of 
potentially eligible units are lone females; fewer than 20% are lone males; and not even 10% are 
aged couples.  Around 10% of individuals falling in the "lone" eligible unit category live with an 
ineligible spouse.   
Imputing Expected SSI Benefits and Eligibility to Receiving Units 
The SSI benefit formula is fairly simple, and the SIPP categorizes income in ways that 
are consistent with that formula.  At first, we follow previous researchers in imputing expected 
benefits and eligibility on the basis of all income, assets, and vehicles.  Later, we use assets, 
vehicles, and social security income alone.  We follow the previous literature in ignoring the 
potential endogeneity of assets and vehicle ownership with respect to SSI participation.   
Researchers must grapple with the important issue of whether to apply state or federal 
policy rules when state-only, federal-only, or state and federal program participation are all 
possible outcomes.  Ignoring state rules cannot be correct when half of federal recipients also 
receive state benefits.  However, computing benefits purely on the basis of state rules also 
generates inaccuracies.  For example, individuals who seek to enroll in Medicaid through SSI, 
even though they live in supplementing states, are permitted to enroll in the federal program 
only.  This can be desirable when state standards for SSI-Medicaid participation are more 
stringent than federal standards.  In later SIPP panels, it is possible to distinguish the exact nature 
of participation.  We use federal-only participation following earlier work, and because the 
administrative data are limited to the federal program.  To the extent that those living in 
  14supplementing states actually find the federal rules most relevant, the use of state rules is another 
source of measurement error in the expected benefit.  
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 presents characteristics of the subsamples comprised of all eligibles, participating 
eligibles, and nonparticipating eligibles for 1984.  Couple units appear equally likely to 
participate or not, while lone female units have a lower propensity to participate.  Married units 
are also disproportionately represented among the eligible nonparticipants.   
  Residing in another's household is associated with higher take-up, as is living in the 
South.  Eligible nonparticipants are more concentrated in metropolitan areas.  Around two-thirds 
of eligible units are white, and whites appear less likely to take up.  There is little difference in 
participation according to age-in-sample (top coded at 85).  Eligible units with greater education, 
private health insurance coverage, and more (non-SSI) income are less likely to participate.   
All individuals reported as covered by SSI in the SIPP are recorded as Medicaid-covered, 
while only 22% of nonparticipants are covered, presumably under their states' medically needy 
programs.  The differential in private health insurance coverage between units that take up and 
those that do not is consistent with the argument that the value of Medicaid plays a positive role 
in take-up.  93 percent of SSI participants are "dual eligibles," covered by both Medicaid and 
Medicare (note that it is easier to qualify for Medicare than for OAI).  SSI recipients are in far 
worse health than nonparticipants and may value insurance coverage more.  However, 
nonparticipants are also somewhat more concentrated in states where it is easiest for SSI 
recipients to enter Medicaid.  Nonparticipants also live more often than participants in states 
offering a higher maximum SSI benefit, consistent with the fact that many southern states do not 
supplement.   
  15On net, estimated expected SSI benefits, based on all income sources, are over 50% 
higher for participants, consistent with a positive effect of benefits on take-up.  SSI is also 
strongly associated with Food Stamp benefits (in California, the two programs are unified).  
Considering all sources of income (including SSI), participating units average only about $20 
less in income than nonparticipants.   
Finally, it is of interest to examine the eligibles found in the SSR files.  By July 1999 (the 
last period covered in our version of the administrative data), 94% of participating eligibles are 
in payment status at some time (fewer--89%--have an application record, indicating that some 
application records are missing in the data).  30% of those who report nonparticipation to the 
SIPP in the interview month have an application on record.  Interestingly, 21% of 
nonparticipating eligibles receive a payment at some time from SSI -- most likely made at a date 
after the interview.
14  If a longer-run view of participation is taken, a total take-up rate of 62% 
(=(192+44)/381) is implied for 1984.  
We also take a historical look at program eligibles.  Tables A1-A3 in Appendix A 
provide these descriptive statistics for all sample years.  Most variable means are fairly stable or 
trendless over the years.  Exceptions are a declining share of whites, growing educational 
attainment, increasing metropolitan status, and reductions in the propensity to be married in the 
sample of all eligibles (Table A1).  Nominal values such as the income from social security, 
expected SSI benefits, and maximum SSI benefits are rising over time, as one expects (both the 
federal portion of the SSI benefit and social security benefits are indexed; any declines in these 
averages across years are due to changing sample composition).  Medicaid, Medicare, and 
private health insurance coverage show no obvious trends in our data period.   
                                                 
14 This is a very safe assumption, as exits of the disabled from SSI and DI are miniscule. 
  16Take-up rates inferred from the SIPP start with a high around 54% in 1986 and 1991 
(very similar to McGarry's estimate, as noted), and are down slightly for the remainder of the 
sample years.  Note that the decline in long-run take-up over the sample years is in large part due 
to right-censoring, since the administrative record ends in July 1999 (see Table A2).   
 
IV.  Methodology and Preliminary Estimates of Take-Up 
  Our approach takes off from McGarry's (1996) basic framework, which relates the net 
cost of enrolling in SSI to the expected monthly SSI cash benefit and other variables thought to 
influence benefits and costs of enrolling.  In particular, an eligible individual participates in SSI 
if the utility gain from participating, Pi*, is positive.  One only observes the final participation 
decision, Pi, where Pi = 1 if Pi* > 0, and Pi = 0 otherwise.  In the estimation, Pi* will be modeled 
as a linear function of the potential benefits of participating, as well as proxies for costs (both 
informational and stigma) and other individual preference-shifters.  That is, 
Pi* = αBi + Xiβ + ei, 
where ei is distributed normally with mean 0 and variance σ
2
e, Bi is the monetary benefit 
associated with participating, and Xi are individual characteristics thought to affect (unobserved) 
preferences for participation in SSI.  Using this framework, our exploration of SSI take-up 
begins by considering more recent data and examining how patterns of take-up rates have 
changed over time  
  Table 3 presents results from simple probit models of the SSI take-up decision for 
repeated cross-sections from 1984 to 1997.  The samples in each year are composed of those 
who report asset and income (from all sources) levels below the maximum eligibility thresholds 
according to SSI program parameters.  As such, one can interpret the models as modeling the 
  17effects of benefit levels and other covariates on the probability of participation, conditional on 
eligibility.  The first column of the table reports the coefficient estimates from McGarry (1996), 
and the second column, for 1984, presents our attempt to replicate McGarry’s results.  Overall, 
we are able to replicate her findings for 1984 remarkably well, especially considering the 
difficulty in replicating the treatment of income and asset levels
15 and exact sample design.  The 
coefficient on the expected SSI benefit slightly differs here relative to McGarry’s sample, with 
an increase from 0.003 (0.001) in McGarry’s sample to 0.004 (0.001) in the current one.  With 
the exception of relative income, our own findings are significant and of the same sign whenever 
McGarry's findings are significant.  We obtain several significant findings that McGarry does not 
(for sex, marital status, Southern residence, care ownership, categorical Medicaid status, and the 
interaction of poor health with categorical Medicaid).  In these cases the signs of the coefficients 
are the same, although magnitudes differ greatly.  Coefficients on other variables of interest, 
such as whether the respondent had any earnings in the past year or participated in any other 
welfare in the past year, both meant to capture the perceived permanence of the need for SSI and 
the sensitivity to welfare stigma, vary little across the two samples.   
  The primary difference between the original results and the replication lies in the counts 
of both eligible and participating units.  McGarry finds 554 SSI-eligible members of the 1984 
SIPP and 310 participants, while we were unable to uncover more than 381 eligibles, of which 
205 participated.  While this discrepancy is puzzling (and efforts to reduce it were unsuccessful), 
it is somewhat comforting to note that the estimates of the take-up rates from the two samples 
agree closely, 56% and 54% from the original and replication, respectively.   
                                                 
15 For example, Federal regulations disregard the value of a car in the asset test if the car is used 
for business purposes, but only $4500 of the value of the car if it is used for other purposes.  
Similarly, other asset restrictions are sufficiently involved that an exact replication of previous 
work is unlikely.  
  18Next, we apply this specification to each calendar year's sample.  Estimated effects of 
home ownership (negative), any earnings in the past year (negative), relative income (negative), 
older age (zero), and Social Security income receipt (zero) are quite stable from year to year.  
The positive effect of the expected benefit amount fades away with time – by 1997, the point 
estimate associated with the expected benefit amount only has roughly 15% of the effect 
estimated in 1984 and is not statistically significant.  The effect of receiving other welfare 
(chiefly Food Stamps) grows dramatically, almost doubling from 1984 to 1997.  There is some 
weak evidence that whites may be taking up less after 1991.  While there is a large negative 
effect of female sex in 1984, this seems to be an aberration.  A discouraging effect of marriage 
on take-up of lone receiving units is also found in most years.   
The time pattern of take-up rates generally suggests that neither benefit levels nor 
information problems (at least those captured by Social Security application) explained much of 
the SSI participation process at the end of the sample timeframe.  One might wonder what 
factors actually did influence take-up in the mid- to late-1990s.  Table 3 also shows that state-
level indicators of categorical Medicaid eligibility, in which an individual is enrolled in Medicaid 
automatically upon participating in SSI, have small but positive effects on take up decisions, 
although these are not statistically significant in later years.  As noted above, there is a strong 
upward trend in Medicaid participation independent of SSI, with rates among nonparticipating 
eligibles topping 20% by the final sample years as shown in Appendix Table A3.  Tables A2 and 
A3 also show a large difference in private health insurance coverage rates between participants 
and non-participating eligibles.  Overall the picture suggests that access to health insurance 
coverage could be dominating the participation decision, with greater access to Medicaid outside 
  19the SSI system explaining low take-up rates.  This is a hypothesis we plan to explore in greater 
detail in the future.   
Tables 4 and 5 present the two-stage and weighted two-stage findings, which correct for 
classical measurement error in potential benefit amounts and classification errors in the SSI-
eligible population, respectively.  Our estimate of the expected benefit effect does not increase 
much for 1984, but doubles in magnitude in many other years, which is to be expected if only 
classical measurement error is present.  Similar to McGarry's findings for 1984, other coefficient 
estimates are little changed from their single-equation versions.  In table 5, McGarry's error 
weighting scheme is also employed.  In each sample, the findings are little changed by this 
procedure.   
Measurement error in both expected benefits and eligibility represents a particularly 
problematic issue to address, with magnitudes and even signs of the bias being difficult to 
determine a priori.
16  Therefore, the inflation of the expected benefit coefficients is not 
necessarily evidence of successfully addressing the issue.  The two-stage weighted procedure 
will yield consistent estimates only if a) the variance of the measurement error in benefits is 
correctly estimated, and b) a researcher finds valid exclusion restrictions, in this case variables 
which affect the expected benefit amount but have no influence on take-up decisions apart from 
their indirect effects through benefit levels.  Our primary concern is with this second 
requirement, as we are not optimistic that a valid instrument exists, at least in the SIPP.  
McGarry uses average household income in the previous year and indicators for whether the 
respondent was not a household head, was married, and lived in a state with benefits that were 
more generous than the average state.  There is no compelling reason to maintain the assumption 
                                                 
16 See Pudney (2001) for a detailed discussion and Monte Carlo analyses of these issues. 
  20that all of these variables are uncorrelated with take-up rates conditional on expected benefit 
levels and the vector of observable characteristics in the second stage.  In unreported models, all 
four “first-stage” variables were significantly correlated with several observable determinants of 
participation included in the second stage, which is indicative that they may also be correlated 
with unobservable determinants of participation.  If this is the case, then the results from the two-
stage procedures may exhibit as much bias as those from the single-equation estimates of Table 
3, with the sign and magnitude of the bias unclear.  As a result, we intend to use other sources of 
information to ameliorate measurement error concerns and focus on single-equation estimates.  
We turn to these methods next. 
 
V.  Alternative Estimates of SSI Participation 
Next, we make several improvements to the base specification.  First, we add age and 
birth cohort, month, and panel dummies to the variable list.  The "over 75" variable, intended to 
identify members of the 1984 sample who are already age-eligible at the initiation of SSI, 
obviously does not play a similar role as time progresses.
17  Instead, birth cohort variables should 
capture any "information effects" from the announcement of SSI, as well as secular trends in 
social attitudes towards welfare.  Current age (controlling for birth cohort) captures how long a 
unit has been "at risk" of SSI participation.  Second, because Food Stamps and SSI participation 
may be simultaneously determined, we are concerned that the Food Stamp variable is correlated 
                                                 
17 It is not clear that the hypothesis is well founded.  One might argue that sample members who 
were near-retirees would have noticed the initiation of SSI more than those well into their elderly 
years.   
  21with the error term.
18  Instead, we redefine the welfare variable to exclude Food Stamp program 
participation.   
The most substantial change involves the calculation of the expected SSI benefit.  As 
explained, above we imputed the expected benefit by applying the benefit formula to all 
available income information.  This approach is problematic.  Some income components may be 
endogenous with respect to SSI participation.  For example, the SSI program taxes earnings at a 
very high 50% rate.  Expected benefits of observed recipients are overstated if the program rules 
discourage work.  This will exaggerate the importance of the value of benefits when estimating 
participation.  The asset test may have a similar influence on asset income--property and other 
asset income may be reduced as a consequence of running down assets to meet the conditions of 
SSI participation.  Finally, individuals who apply to SSI are required to seek all possible public-
source income available to them.  Additional sources of income may therefore arise after SSI 
participation, but not before (e.g., out of ignorance, or because utility-maximization 
considerations argue against collecting such income in the absence of SSI).  To the extent 
possible, it is desirable to focus on income that is exogenous with respect to SSI participation, 
although this focus must be weighed against the loss of information from neglecting other 
income components.   
A second, potentially important, problem is that "occasional" income can be disregarded 
in computing the SSI benefit.  Not only is it difficult to discern when income is occasional, but it 
is not possible to know when it is treated as such by SSA.   
                                                 
18 A possibility for reintroducing Food Stamps, the most common welfare program used by the 
elderly, is to exploit retrospective questions in the SIPP to identify units that apply to food 
stamps prior to turning age 65.   
  22Finally, we measure the expected benefit, as do past researchers, at a single point in time.  
Monthly fluctuations in income may not accurately reflect the expected SSI benefit over a longer 
period (indeed, McGarry introduces the standard deviation of income over the past year in order 
to control for this problem).  Since SSI participation is not a month-to-month decision, and 
cycling is discouraged (the treatment of irregular income is presumably intended to prevent 
cycling), a longer-run estimate of the expected benefit, based on "permanent" old-age income, 
may be a more appropriate basis for the expected benefit.  The monthly Social Security benefit is 
an important component of income that is likely to be reported accurately – since payments are 
typically constant across months within a given year, recall biases are less likely.  Therefore, an 
accurate measure of Social Security benefits contains a great deal of information about potential 
SSI eligibility in the elderly population (in many cases, the Social Security benefit will simply 
preclude SSI eligibility) and the expected SSI benefit.     
Therefore, in order to minimize endogeneity problems, the measurement errors induced 
by occasional income and recall biases, and to better reflect permanent non-SSI income, we base 
our calculation of the expected SSI benefit on social security income alone.  Social security 
benefits are set by a formula that cumulates covered earnings over a lengthy period (up to 35 
years).   
By age 65 benefits are fixed from the individual's perspective (this is particularly obvious 
in the case of OAI claims made prior to age 65).  Examination of the SSI data on participants 
indicates the reasonableness of this approach.  69% of self-reported SSI recipients in the sample 
list social security as their sole income source in the reference month, as opposed to just 12% of 
all elderly nonrecipients.  Of the group of recipients without social security income, a full one-
third receive the exact maximum benefit, almost half are within $10, and 70% are within $25.  
  23The implication is that units reporting no social security income are unlikely to report other 
forms of income, and usually in modest amounts when they do.  As a practical matter, ignoring 
other income components may not generate much measurement error for the relevant group.     
Table 6 presents further information contrasting the distribution of prediction errors (as 
inferred from the sample of recipients, for whom we have actual benefit information) across the 
two approaches to benefit imputation.  In almost every year, for one-half or more units, the two 
approaches yield identical predictions.  When the two approaches differ, the Social-Security-
income based method outperforms the alternative consistently in predicting the exact benefit 
amount.  By definition, this method performs worse when it comes to overstating benefits.  
However, the understatement of benefits appears to be a severe problem when all income sources 
are used.  As a consequence, the conventional method will tend to erroneously exclude units 
from the eligible pool.  Further, in cases where the benefit is understated by the alternative 
method, in most years (the exception being 1997) the average error differs little from the 
expected benefit imputation using all income.   
Before implementing these proposed specification changes, in which we use public-use 
data to estimate revised models of take-up, augmented with the additional variables discussed 
above and using only Social Security income to impute expected benefit (and hence to also 
define the sample of eligibles), we note two unreported intermediate findings.
 19  First, if the 
sample is held constant, i.e., the same as in Table 3, but the expected benefit is redefined based 
solely on social security income, the coefficient estimates of the expected benefit remain 
significantly positive in every year except 1984, although they are smaller.  Second, if we allow 
                                                 
19 Note that the samples are greatly enlarged.   Take-up rates are estimated to be about 10 
percentage points lower in each year, implying that those added to the sample because of the 
change in imputation procedure have a still fairly high take-up rate of around one-third.  
  24the sample of eligibles to change as just described, but continue using an expected benefit based 
on all income, the estimated coefficients for the expected benefit remains similar to those 
reported in Table 3.   
  Table 7 presents the findings after our modifications.  The coefficient for the expected 
SSI benefit is usually smaller in Table 7 than Table 3 (1997 is an exception) and is estimated to 
be insignificantly different from zero for 1993 and 1995 (cohort and sample month coefficient 
estimates are not reported).  The impact of education is larger in absolute magnitude and always 
significantly negative in the alternative specification, as is the (negative) effect of home 
ownership in later years.  The standard deviation of the past year's income and income relative to 
the poverty line are also more often significantly negative.  Most noticeably, the effect of living 
in a state with categorical Medicaid eligibility is strongly positive in each sample year, with a 
probit coefficient of 0.705 (0.210) in 1984 and 0.637 (0.190) in 1997.  These patterns are 
certainly suggestive that insurance rather than cash considerations dominate the SSI take-up 
decision.  Given the above evidence that Social Security benefits predict eligibility and actual 
benefits more accurately than the more comprehensive eligibility measure, we prefer the 
estimates here to those in Table 3. 
  What accounts for the dramatic changes in some of the demographic and financial 
coefficients?  In removing non-Social Security components from the expected benefit, we have 
removed the components of income, i.e., earnings and asset income, most closely associated with 
demographic characteristics.  Demographic characteristics inadvertently captured by these 
income variables may have overstated the importance of the financial benefit, while understating 
the influence of personal characteristics and the importance of non-SSI financial resources in the 
specification of the previous section. 
  25  However, the fact that the sample has changed cannot be ignored.  Under either 
specification, we do not know the extent to which the coefficients reflect take-up or the 
researcher's incorrect guess about which units belong in the sample of eligibles, and when we 
change samples, we also change take-up patterns.  While it is impossible to know eligibility 
status with certainty, we can examine the SSI-application decision more closely.  While 
misclassification problems with the sample remain, at least applications can be said with 
confidence to truly reflect behavior.  We can also study acceptance rates of applicants to learn 
more about the factors that may largely reflect the "administrative process" partially governing 
participation outcomes. 
  
VI.  Estimates of the SSI-Aged Application Decision 
Applications to SSI  
  An additional advantage of administrative data lies in the ability to focus on the true 
behavioral aspect of the SSI take-up process, the decision to apply for benefits.  As noted above, 
although factors that determine acceptance contingent upon application likely differ from factors 
influencing the application choice, this important issue has been neglected in the literature 
because of an implicit assumption that aged applicants are not often rejected.  Appendix Table 
A4 shows that rejections are an empirically important phenomenon.  For the entire time period 
under study, 225 out of 1350 (16.7%) SSI-aged applicants were not awarded benefits by 1999.  
This number rises dramatically to 33% (135 out of 410) among those who we initially classified 
as ineligible according to the definition based only on Social Security earnings and assets, in 
contrast to the 9.6% (90 out of 940) rejected among those who were classified as eligible 
according to this same criteria.  In addition to providing some reassurance that the imputed 
  26eligibility definition is capturing real differences in eligibility, the table shows that SSA rejects 
many applicants, and these rejections are not randomly distributed across observable differences 
in individuals.  
Table 8 presents the major findings when application, rather than participation, is the 
dependent variable.  First, note that the expected benefit does not appear to influence 
applications.  Households with any earnings in the prior year are less likely to apply in the 1997 
sample (and the 1996 estimate is of similar magnitude).  Units that collect other forms of welfare 
(recall this excludes Food Stamps) are usually more likely to apply.  There is some evidence that 
married "lone units," whites, metro residents, car owners (more recently), those with more 
variable and lower relative income in the past year, and females are less likely to apply.  The 
effect of education on applications appears to be smaller than its effect on participation.  In some 
years, living in the household of another and poor health status encourage applications.  On the 
whole, the findings do not provide consistent evidence of great qualitative differences in the 
factors that are important for participation or applications, but if anything, they imply an even 
smaller role in the expected SSI benefit in applications than in actual participation.  In contrast, 
the coefficients on categorical Medicaid eligibility imply that Medicaid is an important 
determinant of the decision to apply for SSI benefits.   
  The application data allow us to refine our hypotheses about SSI-aged applications, and 
when we do so, substantive differences between the behavior of elderly applicants and those in 
the eligible sample who have "aged in" from the disability program emerge.  Table 8a presents 
the estimation findings when the dependent variable equals one only if the application is to the 
"aged" program (made after the 64th birthday).  There are some noticeable differences in the 
qualitative importance of various factors.  Overall, the receipt of other welfare income appears 
  27less important for aged applications, as does marital status, poor health, and variability of 
income.  Again, application decisions appear insensitive to potential benefit amounts, with only 
one of the five years exhibiting a statistically significant effect.  The effect of categorical 
Medicaid eligibility ranges from a low of 0.280 (0.194) in 1997 to a high of 0.603 (0.161) in 
1991.
20 
  To explore the change in coefficients further, in Table 8b we also estimate "SSI-disabled" 
application status for our sample of elderly eligible units.  These people applied to the program 
prior to turning 65.  The most interesting finding is for expected benefits, which have a 
significant positive effect on application to SSI-disabled in the first three samples (they are 
estimated to have a negative effect in 1995).  Receipt of other welfare, race, education, being 
married to a younger (under-65-in-sample) spouse, and poor health all appear to influence 
disabled, but not aged, applications.  Living in the household of another and in an MSA may be 
less important factors for non-aged than aged applicants.  The evidence of a positive impact of 
categorical Medicaid coverage for SSI recipients is also somewhat weaker for disability than 
aged applicants.   
Acceptance of Applicants to SSI 
  Table 9 presents probit estimates of successful aged applications (that is, the application 
is made after age 64 and the payment is received after age 64).  The coefficient estimates may 
reflect persistence of the applicant in the face of setbacks to the claim, as well as characteristics 
                                                 
20 It is our intention in future work to use SSA administrative data on actual SSI benefit amounts, 
rather than self-reports.  Huynh, Rupp, and Sears (2001) discuss the extent of measurement error 
in self-reported SSI benefits, with the principal finding being that self-reported info is 
remarkably accurate (with mean reporting error equaling 2% of actual benefit amounts) except in 
the case of SIPP imputations of benefit amounts, in which the mean reporting error is 150% of 
actual average benefits.  This suggests that the administrative data may be useful in correcting 
SIPP imputation error. 
 
  28that predict a less marginal claim.  Unsurprisingly, the expected benefit amount has a strong 
positive effect on the probability of acceptance.  Home ownership also often has a negative effect 
on acceptance.  Since homes are exempt from the asset test, it may be that this variable is 
correlated with ownership of other assets, or receipt of certain income, that tends to make people 
ineligible.  Race, education, ownership of a single vehicle, and health of applicants appears to 
have little bearing on acceptance into the program.  In some years, sex (female), metropolitan 
location, and living in another's household have a positive effect on acceptance.  Also only 
occasionally, Southern residence, any earned income, and ownership of counted assets may 
negatively predict acceptance.  Living in a state with categorical Medicaid eligibility does not 
appear to be related to the eventual SSA acceptance decision, as expected, although the estimate 
for 1993 is marginally significant.  Curiously, the only variable that consistently influences 
participation, conditional on application, is an indicator for “any Social Security receipt”; all 
other covariates exhibit irregular patterns.  The picture indicates that while the cash income 
component of SSI does not play a large role in the behavioral decision to apply for SSI, it does 
determine eventual SSA acceptance decisions because as estimated benefit levels increase, the 




  The methods presented in this paper have relied on previously unavailable information in 
order to generate new estimates of the determinants of SSI take-up and application decisions.  
While some attention has been paid to the determinants of SSI participation, due largely to low 
take-up rates since the inception of the SSI program in 1974, previous efforts have been 
hampered by the lack of administrative data availability and difficulties in constructing a sample 
  29of eligible aged individuals.  This analysis has extended the previous literature in several 
substantial ways. 
First, we have provided estimates of the SSI take-up decision for a number of years from 
1984 to 1997.  With one exception, no previous research has studied take-up after 1984, but 
major changes to Medicare and Medicaid have likely contributed to changes in the take-up 
decision in the meantime.  We find that the influence of the expected SSI benefit has slightly 
declined over time, while the effect of receiving other welfare has grown dramatically. 
Second, we have constructed an alternative definition of eligibility and potential benefits 
based solely on Social Security earnings and asset levels.  Evidence from administrative data 
suggests that this measure substantially increases the accuracy of eligibility and potential benefit 
imputations, as well as eliminating endogeneity issues resulting from considering other sources 
of current income in determining potential benefits.  Models based on this alternative measure 
point to smaller effects of potential benefit levels in the take-up decision. 
  Third, administrative data on the timing of applications and benefit receipt allow us to 
distinguish between those who applied for the SSI-aged program and those who applied for the 
disabled component and “aged into” the program.  These data also allow for improved accuracy 
of models of take-up because the dependent variable is subject to less measurement error, which 
could be systematically related to key independent variables.   
  Finally, SSA administrative records permit a decomposition of observed participation 
outcomes into the individual’s decision to apply and SSA’s determination of benefit eligibility.  
Application represents the “true” behavioral component, and as such comprises the real question 
of interest to researchers.  Results from these models provide the most dramatic departures from 
previous findings, indicating that the expected SSI benefit does not significantly influence the 
  30decision to apply for benefits, with the imputed potential benefit being estimated to have small 
and insignificant effects on applications in every year but one.  In contrast, the imputed benefit 
significantly positively affects eventual acceptance among SSI-aged applicants in every year of 
the sample.  Taken at face value, these results imply that the prior findings of a positive effect of 
expected benefits on eventual participation decisions results primarily from those with low 
imputed benefits being declared ineligible according to Federal guidelines.  
The findings presented here suggest substantial value for future work in this area.  If 
expected benefits do not significantly explain the SSI application process, there is a need for 
determining what factors do affect applications, specifically access to affordable health 
insurance.  We will explore measures of the availability of health insurance to reflect not only 
state categorical Medicaid eligibility, but also alternatives to SSI such as access to private health 
insurance and the expansion of Medicaid “buy in” programs such as QMB and SLMB.  An 
analysis of these considerations may greatly advance our understanding of the SSI take-up 
decision  
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  32Table 1:  Sample Restrictions 
  Panel  
Description    1984 1990 1991 
Running 
1992 1993 1996 Total 
          













   













   
      *Reorganize into receiving units                    27,314
          
      
      
      *keep if interviewed unit in all waves of  previous calendar year                    25,209
   
      *keep if health information available                    25,044
   













   
SSI-eligible units  393 553 334 537 440 860  3,117
lone  women
 
  295 414   
   
   
247 392 324 632   2,304
lone  men
 
66 95 66 85 79 172   563
couple 32 44 21 60 37 56   250
   
  33Table 2:  Descriptive Statistics of Eligibles by Take-Up Status, 1984 
 All    Participants   Nonparticipants 
Observations (#)  381    205    176 
          
Couple unit  0.076     
(0.266) 




          
Lone female unit  0.769     
(0.422) 
 0.737     
  (0.442) 
  0.807     
(0.396) 
          
Married  0.189    
(0.392) 
  0.156    
(0.364) 
  0.227    
 (0.420) 
          
Unit residing in another's household  0.202     
(0.402) 
 0.229     
 (0.421) 
  0.170     
(0.377) 
          
South  0.475    
(0.500) 
  0.532     
(0.500) 
  0.409     
(0.493) 
          
Metro area  0.685      
(0.465) 
  0.659     
(0.475) 
  0.716      
(0.452) 




  0.659     
(0.475) 
  0.705     
(0.458) 
          
Age
a  74.33     
(6.45) 
  74.50     
(6.27) 
  74.13     
(6.67) 
          
Highest grade completed
a  6.94     
(4.16) 




          
Poor health
a  0.402    
 (0.491) 
  0.517    
(0.501) 
  0.246     
(0.432) 
          
Private health insurance
a  0.236     
(0.425) 
  0.088     
(0.284) 
  0.362     
(0.482) 
          
Medicaid Recipient
a 0.591     
  (0.492) 
 1 
0 
  0.222     
(0.417) 
          
Medicare helps pay bills
a 0.929     
  (0.257) 
  0.931     
(0.253) 
  0.894      
(0.309) 
          
Resides in state where SSI recipients categorically 
eligible for Medicaid 
0.772     
 (0.420) 
  0.805    
(0.397) 
  0.864     
(0.344) 
          
Food Stamp benefit to unit ($)  14.57    
 (36.83) 
  22.22    
(45.90) 
  8.61     
(34.50) 
          
Total unit income, excluding SSI ($)  243.35   
 (160.81) 
  196.27    
(140.58) 
  404.15     
(216.11) 
          






          
Social security income ($)  207.39    
(143.41) 
  174.01    
(133.85) 
  246.27     
(144.74) 
  34          
Max SSI benefit associated with unit ($)  372.64     
 (86.85) 
  367.93     
84.26 
  556.24   
(104.69) 
          
Federal SSI receiving unit  0.538  





          
SSI Income to unit ($)  102.33   
 (134.91) 
  189.69    
(131.35) 
  0.217    
(2.527) 
          
Expected SSI benefit to unit, based on social 
security income only  
164.32   
(128.38) 
  187.18    
(133.28) 
 137.70   
(117.29) 
          
Expected SSI benefit to unit, based on all income($)  143.15     
(118.02) 
  172.33    
(122.31) 
  109.16   
  (103.20) 
          
Record of application to SSI




          
Record of payment from SSI




Notes:  Each observation is a (potential) SSI-receiving unit satisfying the age requirement.  All dollar figures are 
measured on a monthly basis in nominal dollars.   
aIn the case of couple units, the information is for the senior member.   
bAdministrative data.   
  35Table 3:  Estimates of SSI-Participation for Eligible Sample Units (Probits) 
 McGarry 
(JHR, 1996) 
1984 1991 1993  1995  1997 
 554  381  534  810  403  409 






0.004*   
(0.001) 
0.003*   
(0.001) 
0.002*   
(0.000) 
0.002**   
(0.001) 
0.0006   
(0.001) 





-.710***   
(0.400 
-0.620**   
(0.315) 
-0.439***   
(0.257) 
-.848**   
(0.3932 
-0.794**   
(0.381) 





0.960*   
(0.183) 
0.920*    
0.159 
1.07*    
0.130 
1.16*    
(0.185) 
1.52*   
(0.176) 
            
Over 75  -0.075 
(0.125) 
-0.120   
(0.168) 








            
White -0.119 
(0.142) 
0.137   
(0.180) 
-.045    
(0.135) 
-.250**   
(0.118) 




            
Female -0.111 
(0.178) 
-.527**   
(0.226) 
0.111    
(0.170) 




-0.079   
(0.206) 





-0.032   
(0.020) 
-0.048*   
(0.018) 
-0.055*   
(0.015) 
-0.027   
(0.022) 
-0.014   
(0.012) 
            
Married -0.0058 
(0.2394) 
-.826*   
(0.259) 
-0.478**   
(0.202) 
-0.526*   
(0.1715 
-0.485***   
(0.253) 
-0.243   
(0.247) 
            
Owns home  -0.4326* 
(0.1453) 
-.446*   
(0.177) 
-0.171    
(0.139) 
-0.450*      
(0.115) 
-0.273***   
(0.161) 
-0.400**   
(0.169) 







0.070    
(0.228) 
0.119   
(0.196) 




            
South 0.095 
(0.159) 
0.348***   
(0.197) 
0.280***   
(0.143) 
0.166   
(0.125) 




            
MSA -0.2391 
(0.153) 
-0.215   
(0.193) 




-0.277   
(0.179) 
-0.069   
0.186 
            
Owns car  -0.200 
(0.1721) 
-.375***   
(0.194) 




-0.213   
(0.169) 
-.0164   
(0.1713 





0.419    
(0.259) 
0.827*   
(0.256) 
0.336***   
(0.173) 
-0.148   
(0.286) 
1.14***    
0.600 
            
Poor health  0.5740 
(0.2642) 
1.213*   
(0.363) 
0.631***   
(0.350) 
0.223   
(0.289) 
0.311   
(0.454) 
-0.104    
(0.466) 






0.491***   
0.266) 
0.653*   
0.187) 
0.559*   
(0.146) 
0.290 
   0.208) 
0.330    
0.245) 
            
Poor*Cat  -0.009  -0.743***    -0.545    0.310   0.068    0.200 
  36Medicaid (0.304)  (0.409)  (0.389)  (0.325)  (0.500)    (0.496) 
            
Any assets  -0.208 
(0.137) 
-0.041   
(0.184) 




-.370***   
(0.1975 
0.128   
(0.166) 
            
Standard 




-0.0001   
(0.0002) 
-0.001*   
(0.0002) 




-0.0002   
(0.0001) 
            
Income relative 
to poverty line 
-0.965* 
(0.275) 




-0.580*   
(0.225 
-0.608**   
(0.290) 
-0.757***   
(0.393) 
            
Constant 0.191 
(0.420) 
-0.699   
(0.624) 
-0.698   
(0.454) 
0.200   
(0.380) 
0.991   
(0.630) 
-0.339    
(0.765) 
Notes:  All columns except the first include month and panel-in-survey dummy variables, as appropriate.  
acomputed 
as in McGarry, using all income sources. 
  37Table 4:  Two-Stage Probit Estimates of Participation, Instrumenting the Expected SSI Benefit 
for Measurement Error 
  1984 1984  1991 1993 1995  1997 
 McGarry 
(JHR, 1996) 













  554 381  534 810 403  409 




0.004*    
(0.001) 
0.007*   
(0.001) 
0.006*   
(0.001) 
0.007***   
(0.003) 
0.004**   
(0.002) 
          
Any earnings, prior year  -0.715 
 
-0.643 -0.521  -0.392  -0.680***  -0.644*** 
 (0.351)  (0.400)  0.323  (0.256)  (0.396)  (0.380) 
          
Any other welfare  0.793 
(0.147) 
0.900*   
(0.179) 
.934*   
.1584 
1.067*   
0.129 
1.177*   
0.1838 
1.42*   
0.1712 
          
Over 75  -0.054 
(0.126) 
-0.136   
0.166) 
-0.020   
0.158) 
0.0621586   
0.063) 




          
White -0.171 
(0.143) 
0.163    
0.178 
-0.0453658   
0.134 
-0.235**   
0.117 
-0.270***   
0.163) 
-0.341**   
0.159 
          
Female -0.069 
(0.179) 
-0.456**   
0.221 
0.169    
0.173 
0.021   
(0.148) 
0.019   
(0.212) 
-0.100   
0.203 
          
Years school completed  -0.025 
0.013 
-0.040**   
0.01985 
-0.046*   
0.0177529 
-0.049*   
0.0154 
-0.0259623   
0.02135 
-0.009   
0.0118726 
          
Married -0.320 
0.272 
-0.828*    
(0.255) 
-0.624*   
0.2085 
-0.683*   
0.1793 
-0.702**   
0.35376 
-0.368   
0.2524 
          
Owns home  -0.398 
0.145 
-0.401**   
0.175 
-0.1966481   
0.1368 
-0.439*    
0.115 
-0.256844   
0.1600 
-0.412**   
0.16778 
          
Receives social security  0.275 
0.211 
0.084   
0.241 
-0.1921011   
0.2249 
-0.0716425   
0.1866 
-0.653*   
0.2383 
0.048   
0.2431 





0.406*   
0.1550 
0.280**   
0.130 
0.150   
0.178 
-0.098   
0.168 
          
MSA -0.190 
0.151 
-0.200   
(0.192) 
-0.1502585   
0.1575 
-0.338*   
(0.126) 
-0.324***   
(0.179) 
-0.173   
(0.188) 
          
Owns car  -0.173 
0.176 
0.279221   
0.190582 
-0.349**   
0.14871 
-0.038   
0.120 
-0.242   
(0.168) 
-0.219   
(0.172) 
          
Household of another  -0.128 
0.135 
0.3434791   
0.26061 
0.567**   
0.2453 
0.1417685   
0.169597 
-0.750**   
0.3546 
1.20*   
0.42556 
          
Poor health  0.586 
0.266 
1.231*   
0.357596 
0.563***   
0.3433 
0.297   
(0.295) 
0.296   
(0.448) 
-0.144   
0.44572 
          




0.476***   
0.266 
0.589*    
0.185 
0.425*   
(0.150) 
0.3011653   
0.2062 
0.1964759   
0.24723 
          
Poor*Cat Medicaid  -0.017 
0.307 
-0.825*   
0.40247 
-0.5181711   
0.3810 
0.1960419   
0.3287 
0.0479559   
0.4920 
0.3168898   
0.4758 
          
Any assets  -0.191 
0.138 
-0.064   
0.18195 
0.2046159   
0.165258 
0.0218671   
0.1643 
-0.331***   
0.1949 
0.1424703   
0.16505 
          
Standard deviation of 
past year's income 
-0.015 
0.010 
-0.0001    
0.0002 
-0.001*   
0.0001 
-0.0003**   
0.0001487 
-3.78e-06   
0.0001 
-0.0002   
0.00014 
          




-0.490   
(0.394) 
-0.561**    
0.25544 
-0.957*     
0.227 
-0.847*   
0.290 
0.387   
0.627 
          
Constant -0.379 
(0.495) 
-0.355   
0.6048 
-0.841***   
0.4878 




-0.930   
0.7755 
Notes:  All columns except the first include month and panel-in-survey dummy variables, as appropriate.  
acomputed 
as in McGarry, using all income sources. 
  39Table 5:  Weighted Two-Stage Probit Estimates of Participation (instrumenting for measurement 
error in benefits and weighting for measurement error in eligibility determination)  
 
McGarry 














    
Expected SSI benefit
a  0.007*  0.007* 0.006*** 0.005*  0.006**  0.006** 
  0.002  0.003  0.004 0.002 0.003 0.002 
     
Over 75  0.121  -0.155  -0.096 0.091 -0.099 -0.032 
 0.164  0.137  0.136 0.057 0.069 0.072 
       
White -0.311  0.099 -0.045  -0.238**  -0.316*** -0.355* 
  0.196  0.153  0.134 0.105 0.169 0.135 
          
Female  -0.094  -0.269  0.195 0.028 0.040 -0.014 
  0.226  0.180  0.167 0.128 0.209 0.170 
     
Years school completed  -0.031  -0.046** -0.043**  -0.054* -0.028  -0.008 
 0.015  0.018  0.019 0.014 0.019 0.012 
     
Married -0.407  -0.299  0.938 0.718*** 0.714  0.627 
 0.297  0.258  0.886 0.444 0.725 0.416 
     
Owns home  -0.645*  -0.212 -0.212*** -0.477*  -0.379**  -0.496* 
 0.196  0.152  0.125 0.101 0.175 0.143 
          
Receives social security  0.352  0.055 -0.123  0.046  -0.468*** 0.086 
  0.259  0.266  0.214 0.217 0.253 0.240 
          
Any other welfare  1.036*  0.753*  0.854* 1.018* 0.935* 1.168* 
  0.216  0.141  0.143 0.108 0.158 0.137 
     
South 0.378  0.345** 0.309**  0.201***  0.223  0.031 
 0.212  0.171  0.155 0.112 0.156 0.142 
     
MSA -0.385  -0.262*** -0.146  -0.267**  -0.225 -0.201 
 0.193  0.143  0.140 0.109 0.175 0.155 
          
Owns car  -0.167  -0.067 -0.396**  -0.073  -0.138  -0.337** 
  0.216  0.159  0.161 0.106 0.155 0.149 
     
Household of another  0.164  0.733*** 1.843*** 1.486*  0.973  2.766* 
 0.173  0.452  1.043 0.553 1.095 1.058 
     
Poor health  0.909  1.030* 0.604**  0.275 0.228 0.139 
 0.392  0.291  0.275 0.272 0.299 0.361 
     
Categorical Medicaid eligibility  0.156  0.399*** 0.603*  0.391* 0.271  0.332***
    
   
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
  40 0.240  0.243  0.155 0.130 0.184 0.197 
          
Poor*Cat Medicaid  -0.259  -0.587***  -0.595*** 0.134 0.134 -0.054 
  0.440  0.325  0.316 0.301 0.359 0.391 
     
Any Earnings  -1.137  -0.662 -0.537  -0.338  -0.538  -0.248 
 0.384  0.558  0.351 0.288 0.533 0.329 
     
Any assets  -0.2667  0.083 0.217  -0.067  -0.336*** 0.234***
 0.172  0.163  0.149 0.156 0.192 0.141 
     
Standard deviation of past year's income  -0.005  0.000 -0.001*  0.000*  0.000  0.000** 
 0.011  0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
     
Income relative to poverty line  -0.057  -0.018  0.956 0.646 0.767 1.361 
  0.257  0.859  1.563 0.892 1.162 1.234 
          
Constant  -0.744  -1.161 -1.359  -0.892  -.2516  -1.698***
  (0.547)  0.921  1.327 0.841 0.992 0.987 
    
    
    
    
Notes:  All columns except the first include month and panel-in-survey dummy variables, as appropriate.  
acomputed 
as in McGarry, using all income sources. 
  41Table 6:  Measurement Error in the Calculation of Expected Benefits under Alternative Methods 
      
Year
0.605 






















          
                   
           
               
                             
                    
        
                 
                             
                    
        
                 
                             
                    
  
                 
                             
                    
         
               
1984    233    0.266    
 
  0.129      0.309    0.266    0.425 
   
  0.554 
        47.31    
(58.54)   
 
0    79.45   





0   74.31
  
337 0.261 0.110 0.629 0.350 0.205   0.445
   
0.531
  
        67.12   
(91.03)      
 
  0    77.85
(98.88) 
 
  0    121.95    
(134.12) 
   
1993 494 0.279 0.117 0.603 0.364 0.219   0.417
      
      64.08   
(75.37) 
 
  0    144.19   





  0  123.34   
(150.90) 
      
1995 259 0.479 0.151 0.371 0.205   0.336
   
0.583
  
        54.74    
(86.14) 
 
  0  196.46   
(220.61)    
 
  71.10   
(92.59)      
 
  0    186.56   
(172.34)  
      
1997 280 0.093 0.639 0.529 0.139   0.332




                       
  
 
(86.52)          
   
1991
117.85   
(136.47)    
    
0.569




        57.01   
(81.29)    
  0    363.27   
(450.71) 
  84.65   
(115.81)     
0   193.59
(193.60) 
Table notes:  For each year, first row is fraction of self-reported recipient units in that class, and the second row presents the mean and 
standard deviation of the prediction error for that subsample.  Public use data on units self-reporting SSI income in the SIPP.   
 
  42 Table 7:  Probit estimates of SSI-Participation for Eligible Sample Units
a  




765  1302 
 
 545  656 
 
Expected SSI benefit
a  0.001***   0.001*   0.000  0.000   0.001***
  0.001   0.000   0.000  0.001  0.000 
             
Any earnings, prior year  -0.103   -0.338   -0.159  -0.271  -0.316 
  0.279   0.206   0.168  0.315  0.218 
             
Any other welfare  0.525***  0.136  0.598*   0.623**   0.531* 
  0.271   0.227   0.163  0.260  0.150 
             
White  0.008    0.076    -0.169***  -0.334**   -0.143 
  0.151   0.111   0.094  0.141  0.119 
             
Female  -0.265  -0.067   -0.060    -0.157    0.193 
  0.178   0.138   0.111  0.172  0.144 
             
Years school completed  -0.056*   -0.034**   -0.069*   -0.043**  -0.024** 
  0.018   0.014   0.012  0.018  0.010 
             
Married  -0.643*  -0.072   -0.312**    -0.380***    0.064 
  0.199   0.164   0.130  0.207  0.178 
             
Owns home  -0.430*  -0.309  -0.612*  -0.489*  -0.538* 
  0.146   0.110   0.089  0.134  0.124 
             
Receives social security  0.596**    0.273   -0.018  0.245   0.550** 
  0.256   0.197   0.162  0.261  0.220 
             
South  0.307***   0.144   0.012  0.057  -0.105 
  0.159   0.117   0.094  0.139  0.120 
             
MSA  -0.232  -0.423  -0.335*   -0.181    -0.332** 
  0.162   0.129   0.097  0.152  0.138 
             
Owns car  0.089   -0.236   -0.114    -0.339**    -0.209***
  0.156   0.121   0.092  0.140  0.126 
             
  43Household of another  -0.083    0.228    0.238***  0.161   0.996* 
  0.213   0.201   0.139  0.227  0.459 
             
Poor health  1.041*    0.765    0.493**   0.164  0.424 
  0.287   0.274   0.226  0.357  0.355 
             
Categorical Medicaid eligibility  0.679*  0.676  0.505*   0.307***    0.413** 
  0.213   0.151   0.112  0.171  0.177 
             
Poor*Cat Medicaid  -0.908*  -0.761   -0.143    0.297    -0.314 
  0.328   0.306   0.254  0.398  0.379 
             
Any assets  -0.110  -0.037   -0.080    -0.341**    -0.082 
  0.149   0.132   0.127  0.165  0.123 
             
Standard deviation of past year's 
income  -0.001**  0.000*  0.000**   0.000    0.000 
  0.000   0.000   0.000  0.000  0.000 
             
Income relative to poverty line  -1.274*  -0.899  -0.672*  -1.097*  -0.717* 
  0.196   0.133   0.070  0.175  0.121 
             
Constant  0.223  0.389  1.239*  1.745*   -1.035***
  0.490   0.372   0.299  0.502  0.576 
Notes: 
aExpected SSI benefit computed using only Social Security income as reported in the SIPP.  All 
specifications include month and panel dummies.  Eligibility is defined as meeting asset test, owning fewer than two 
vehicles and an expected benefit exceeding zero.  Age and birth cohort dummies not included in these specifications.   
  44TABLE 8:  Probit Estimates of any SSI Application by Eligible Units
a 




765   1302 
 
 545  656 
 
Expected SSI benefit
a  0.001 0.001 0.000  -0.001  0.001***
  0.001 0.000 0.000  0.001   0.000
               
Any earnings, prior year  -0.209 -0.286 -0.178  -0.484  -0.423**
  0.278 0.198 0.162  0.316   0.213
               
Any other welfare  0.481*** 0.270 0.376**  0.954*  0.244***
 0.270  0.232  0.157  0.264    0.146
               
White  -0.057 -0.035 -0.214**  -0.379*  -0.151
  0.150 0.109 0.092  0.138   0.115
               
Female  -0.273 -0.360* -0.103  -0.367**  0.088
  0.178 0.137 0.109  0.170   0.139
               
Years school completed  -0.046* -0.018 -0.053*  -0.020  -0.007
  0.017 0.014 0.011  0.017   0.010
               
Married  -0.480** -0.232 -0.370*  -0.689*  -0.082
  0.196 0.162 0.127  0.211   0.169
               
Owns home  -0.258*** -0.379* -0.598*  -0.357*  -0.518*
  0.145 0.109 0.087  0.132   0.121
               
Receives social security  0.508** 0.310 -0.013  -0.048  0.403***
  0.254 0.194 0.160  0.255   0.211
               
South  0.215 0.119 0.042  0.202  0.010
  0.159 0.116 0.091  0.136   0.117
               
MSA  -0.190 -0.266** -0.280*  0.032  -0.333**
  0.163 0.128 0.095  0.148   0.133
               
Owns car  -0.058 -0.144 -0.074  -0.352**  -0.323*
  0.155 0.119 0.090  0.138   0.122
               
Household of another  -0.145 0.160 0.276**  0.232  0.820**
  0.214 0.200 0.137  0.224   0.413
               
Poor health  1.020* 0.901* 0.136  0.317  0.643***
  0.284 0.272 0.228  0.356   0.343
               
Categorical Medicaid eligibility  0.644* 0.719* 0.394*  0.207  0.275***
  0.207 0.148 0.107  0.169   0.169
  45               
Poor*Cat Medicaid  -0.994* -0.841* 0.195  -0.143  -0.525
  0.326 0.303 0.254  0.394   0.367
               
Any assets  -0.418* -0.119 -0.049  -0.306***  0.071
  0.147 0.130 0.124  0.163   0.120
               
Standard deviation of past year's income  -0.001* 0.000* 0.000**  0.000  0.000
  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000   0.000
               
Income relative to poverty line  -1.217* -0.846* -0.628*  -0.910*  -0.493*
  0.191 0.127 0.068  0.166   0.103
               
Constant  0.535 -0.002 0.009  -0.431**  -0.654
 0.490  0.146  0.116  0.180    0.531
Notes: 
aExpected SSI benefit computed using only Social Security income as reported in the SIPP.  All 
specifications include month and panel dummies.  Eligibility is defined as meeting asset test, owning fewer than two 
vehicles and an expected benefit exceeding zero.  Age and birth cohort dummies not included in these specifications.   
  46Table 8a:  Estimation of Applications Post-Age-64 ("aged") to SSI program
a 




765   1302 
 
 545  656 
 
Expected SSI benefit
a  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000   0.001***
  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.000 
               
Any earnings, prior year  0.177  -0.009  0.042  -0.237  -0.513 
  0.284  0.213  0.183  0.314  0.270 
               
Any other welfare  0.466***  0.141  -0.029  0.262  0.106 
  0.256  0.242  0.173  0.271  0.162 
           
White  -0.095   0.090   -0.129  -0.273   0.049 
  0.150  0.114  0.095  0.142  0.130 
           
Female  -0.280   -0.320**   -0.105  -0.159   0.141 
  0.179  0.142  0.116  0.175  0.157 
           
Years school completed  -0.033***  -0.009  -0.006  0.022  0.008 
  0.018  0.015  0.012  0.018  0.010 
           
Married  -0.248  -0.068  -0.038  -0.277  0.108 
  0.204  0.171  0.136  0.222  0.191 
           
Owns home  -0.148   -0.216***   -0.363*   -0.355**   -0.190 
  0.145  0.115  0.093  0.140  0.136 
           
Receives social security  0.435***  0.203   0.316***  0.335  0.201 
  0.256  0.203  0.169  0.261  0.226 
           
South  0.225  0.165  0.124  0.050  -0.006 
  0.157  0.120  0.097  0.140  0.133 
           
MSA  -0.104   -0.318**    -0.245**  -0.148  -0.129 
  0.158  0.131  0.100  0.155  0.151 
           
Owns car  0.030  0.030  0.034   -0.218    -0.279***
  0.157  0.125  0.097  0.145  0.140 
           
Household of another  -0.087  -0.009   0.341**   0.442***   0.587 
  0.215  0.207  0.140  0.222  0.460 
           
Poor health  0.560**   0.194  0.227  0.133  0.283 
  0.284  0.305  0.244  0.374  0.384 
           
Categorical Medicaid eligibility  0.592*  0.603*  0.393*   0.388**    0.280 
  0.222  0.161  0.121  0.185  0.194 
  47           
Poor*Cat Medicaid  -0.657**   -0.348  -0.189  -0.319  -0.582 
  0.323  0.334  0.269  0.415  0.411 
           
Any assets  -0.174  -0.153  0.020  -0.079  0.227 
  0.150  0.137  0.135  0.171  0.131 
           
Standard deviation of past year's income  0.000  0.000   0.000**  0.000  0.000 
  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
           
Income relative to poverty line  -1.024*  -0.746*  -0.877*  -0.574*  -0.374* 
  0.206  0.141  0.123  0.166  0.118 
           
Constant  -0.318  -0.353  -0.214  -0.226   -1.538* 
  0.491  0.386  0.308  0.500  0.591 
Notes: 
aExpected SSI benefit computed using only Social Security income as reported in the SIPP.  All 
specifications include month and panel dummies.  Eligibility is defined as meeting asset test, owning fewer than two 
vehicles and an expected benefit exceeding zero.  Age and birth cohort dummies not included in these specifications.   
 
 
  48Table 8b:  Estimation of Applications Pre-Age-64 ("disabled") to SSI program  
a
  1984  1991  1993  1995  1997 
533  765   1302   545  656 
       
Expected SSI benefit  
a 0.002*    0.001**   0.001***  -0.001***   0.000 
  0.001  0.001  0.000  0.001  0.001 
             
Any earnings, prior year  -0.329  -0.134   -0.555**  -0.087  -0.246 
  0.426  0.256  0.266  0.374  0.283 
             
Any other welfare  -0.213   0.302   0.620*  0.757*  0.413* 
  0.368  0.264  0.165  0.272  0.159 
           
White  -0.116    -0.265**    -0.099   -0.265***  -0.247***
  0.193  0.128  0.104  0.148  0.131 
           
Female  -0.173  -0.048  -0.121  -0.141  0.151 
  0.244  0.166  0.127  0.183  0.163 
             
Years school completed  -0.067*   -0.003   -0.056*  -0.079*   -0.010 
  0.025  0.017  0.014  0.020  0.012 
             
Married  -0.845*    -0.361***   -0.526*   -0.192  -0.017 
  0.289  0.205  0.162  0.230  0.206 
             
Owns home  -0.338***  -0.233***   -0.389*   -0.266***   -0.569* 
  0.206  0.134  0.102  0.145  0.141 
             
Receives social security  0.494  0.370  0.110  -0.122   0.449***
  0.327  0.234  0.180  0.277  0.241 
           
South  -0.201  -0.023  -0.109  -0.105  -0.039 
  0.221  0.143  0.107  0.151  0.133 
           
MSA  -0.087  -0.236  -0.091  0.144   -0.278***
  0.219  0.158  0.110  0.165  0.153 
           
Owns car  0.038   -0.281***  -0.066  -0.154  -0.142 
  0.218  0.148  0.106  0.152  0.143 
           
Household of another  -0.140  0.251  -0.103  -0.283  0.668 
  0.322  0.246  0.162  0.255  0.547 
           
Poor health  0.692***   0.742**    0.419***  0.413  0.516 
  0.384  0.312  0.259  0.367  0.396 
           
Categorical Medicaid eligibility  0.362   0.338***   0.222***  0.036  0.292 
  0.316  0.190  0.132  0.189  0.212 
  49           
Poor*Cat Medicaid  -0.448  -0.461  0.001  0.156  -0.114 
  0.442  0.347  0.285  0.409  0.419 
           
Any assets  -0.001  -0.132  -0.227   -0.321***   -0.104 
  0.216  0.173  0.161  0.195  0.141 
           
Standard deviation of past year's income  -0.001**   -0.001*   0.000**   0.000    0.000 
  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
           
Income relative to poverty line  -0.935*  -0.712*  -0.433*  -1.223*  -0.850* 
  0.276  0.176  0.077  0.263  0.171 
           
Constant  0.296  -0.246  0.212  1.581*  -1.084 
  0.670  0.440  0.336  0.562  0.673 
Notes: 
aExpected SSI benefit computed using only Social Security income as reported in the SIPP.  All 
specifications include month and panel dummies.  Eligibility is defined as meeting asset test, owning fewer than two 
vehicles and an expected benefit exceeding zero.  Age and birth cohort dummies not included in these specifications.   
 
  50Table 9:  Probit Estimates of SSI-Aged Acceptance among SSI-Aged Applicants 
 1984    1991    1993    1995    1997 
           
Expected SSI benefit
a  0.002**   0.002*  0.001*   0.001**   0.003* 
  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.001 
           
White  0.050  -0.138  0.211  -0.387  0.393 
  0.231  0.211  0.178  0.302  0.316 
           
Female  0.008   0.486**  0.401**   0.165    0.541 
  0.276  0.229  0.189  0.340  0.355 
           
Years school completed  0.028  0.042  -0.024  0.044  0.004 
  0.032  0.027  0.021  0.031  0.018 
           
Married  -0.042  -0.318  -0.083   -0.947***    1.166** 
  0.313  0.269  0.260  0.433  0.588 
           
Owns home  -0.520**  -0.414***   -0.262   -0.480***   -0.047 
  0.246  0.212  0.171  0.270  0.338 
           
Receives social security  0.171  0.289   0.626**   0.626   1.354* 
  0.353  0.294  0.251  0.407  0.433 
           
Any  other  welfare  0.092  -0.284  0.246      -0.231 
  0.485  0.393  0.385   Dropped   0.387 
           
South  0.143  0.068  0.054  0.072   -0.497***
  0.241  0.201  0.164  0.265  0.308 
           
MSA  -0.146   0.251   0.282***  0.164  -0.180 
  0.247  0.219  0.171  0.284  0.341 
           
Owns car  -0.136   0.349  -0.230  0.352  0.273 
  0.256  0.226  0.182  0.297  0.352 
           
Household of another  0.637***  0.411  -0.030   0.846***   0.211 
  0.353  0.353  0.241  0.464  0.393 
           
Poor health  0.307  -0.353  0.689  0.180  -1.083 
  0.415  0.531  0.503  0.557  0.718 
           
Categorical Medicaid eligibility  0.447  0.110   0.440**   0.391  -0.331 
  0.346  0.288  0.226  0.363  0.489 
           
Poor*Cat Medicaid  -0.205  0.241   -0.899***  -0.204  0.833 
  0.500  0.589  0.552  0.650  0.777 
           
  51Any earnings, prior year  0.241    -1.415*    0.175    0.116    -0.703 
  0.464  0.377  0.408  0.570  0.579 
           
Any assets  -0.195   0.060  0.024  0.018   -0.777** 
  0.231  0.238  0.221  0.271  0.320 
           
Standard deviation of past year's income  0.000    0.000    0.000***  0.000**   0.000 
  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
           
Income relative to poverty line  -0.025  -0.343   -0.631*   -0.319  -0.349 
  0.233  0.256  0.213  0.243  0.290 
Notes: 
aExpected SSI benefit computed using only Social Security income as reported in the SIPP.  All 
specifications include month and panel dummies.  Eligibility is defined as meeting asset test, owning fewer than two 
vehicles and an expected benefit exceeding zero.  Age and birth cohort dummies not included in these specifications.  
Constant terms were inadvertently omitted.  In the case of 1995, all units with other welfare income were successful 
applicants.   
  52APPENDIX A:  DESCRIPTIVE STATICS BY CALENDAR YEAR,  
ELIGIBLITY AND TAKE-UP STATUS 
 
TABLE A1:  Descriptive Statistics: All Eligible Units  
  1984  1991 1993 1995 1997 
Nobs  381  535 813 403 409 
        
Couple unit  0.076    
(0.266) 
0.077    
(0.266) 
0.082    
(0.275) 
0.079    
(0.271) 
0.054    
(0.226) 
        
Lone female unit  0.769    
(0.422) 
0.776    
(0.418) 
0.771    
(0.420) 
0.774     
(0.419) 
0.773    
(0.420) 
        
In another's household  0.202    
(0.402) 
0.140    
(0.348) 
0.151    
(0.356) 
0.151    
(0.359) 
0.137    
(0.344) 
        
White 0.680 
(0.467) 
0.604   
(0.490) 
0.695    
(0.461) 
0.645    
(0.479) 
0.601    
(0.490) 
        
Age  74.33    
(6.45) 
74.16   
(6.49) 
74.87    
(6.29) 
74.21    
(6.10) 
74.37   
(6.43) 
        
Highest grade completed  6.94   
(4.16) 
8.13     
(3.94) 
8.90     
(3.74) 
9.20     
(3.95) 
9.18   
(6.17) 
        
South  0.475    
(0.500) 
0.426    
(0.495) 
0.351     
(0.477) 
0.422    
(0.494) 
0.465    
(0.499) 
        
Metro area  0.685     
(0.465) 




0.717    
(0.451) 
0.743    
(0.437) 
        
Married  0.189    
(0.392) 
0.179    
(0.384) 
0.187    
(0.390) 
0.159    
(0.366) 
0.149    
(0.357) 
        
Social security income  207.39    
(143.41) 
268.15    
(191.79) 
296.70    
(205.54) 
289.79   
(206.18) 
284.92   
(211.02) 
        










        
Expected SSI benefit, based on SS  164.32    
(128.38) 
216.14   
(165.27) 
232.34     
(183.53) 
219.82    
(169.74) 
262.95    
204.06) 
        
Expected SSI benefit, based on all 
income 
143.15   
(118.02) 
188.73    
(150.48) 
196.66    
(171.86) 
208.80    
(174.3481 
203.75    
(152.529 
        
Max SSI benefit for unit in state  372.64     
(86.85) 
495.51    
(148.31) 
522.63   
(144.84) 
526.71   
(101.91) 
563.98    
(127.12) 




131.10   
(191.96) 
134.30   
(195.11) 
149.47    
(211.75) 
        
Total HH income, excluding SSI  243.35    
(160.13) 
328.86    
(344.01) 
368.25    
(330.72) 
446.54   
(596.41) 
339.63    
(247.15) 
        
Medicaid Recipient  0.591     0.607     0.540     0.568     0.597    
  53(0.492)  (0.489) (0.499) (0.496) (0.491) 
        
Private health  0.236    
(0.425) 
0.217    
(0.412) 
0.261    
(0.439) 
0.268    
(0.443) 
0.257    
(0.437) 
        
Medicare helps pay  0.929    
(0.257) 
0.935    
(0.247) 
0.925    
(0.264) 
0.918    
(0.275) 
0.902    
(0.297) 
        
HH Food Stamp Benefits  14.57    
(36.83) 
20.41    
(60.93) 
17.90     
(43.56) 
20.13    
(56.40) 
18.79    
(45.703) 
        
Federal SSI receipt  0.538    
(0.499) 
0.536    
(0.499) 
0.491    
(0.500) 
0.501      
(0.501) 
0.494     
(0.501) 
        










        










        
Poor health  0.402    
(0.491) 
0.260    
(0.439) 
0.213    
(0.410) 
0.226     
(0.419) 
0.284     
(0.451) 
        
SSI recipient categorically eligible for 
Medicaid in state 
0.772     
(0.420) 
0.785    
(0.411) 
0.763    
(0.426) 
0.767    
(0.423) 
0.851    
(0.357) 
 
  54TABLE A2:  Descriptive Statistics by Eligibility and Take-Up Status by Year-in-Sample: Participating 
Eligibles (SIPP-Admin. matched data)  
  1984 1991 1993  1995  1997 
Nobs  205 286 398  202  202 
         
Couple unit  0.078     
(0.269)   
0.056    
(0.230) 
0.073    
(0.260) 
0.059    
(0.237) 
0.059   
(0.237) 
         
In another's household  0.229    
(0.421) 
0.178    
(0.383) 
0.171    
(0.377) 
0.183    
(0.388) 
0.173    
(0.379) 
         
white  0.659    
(0.475) 
0.566    
(0.496) 
0.616    
(0.487) 
0.554    
(0.498) 
0.515    
(0.501) 
         
Eligible unit is a female  0.737    
0.4415 
0.804    
(0.398) 
0.789    
(0.409) 
0.782    
(0.414) 
0.772    
(0.420) 
         
age 74.50     
6.27 
74.38    
(6.46) 
74.73   
(6.15) 
74.93    
(5.96) 
73.98    
(6.31) 
         
Highest grade completed  5.86    
3.97 
7.38    
(3.82) 
7.99    
(3.77) 
8.52    
(3.81) 
(8.25   
6.09) 
         
South  .532    
.500 
.479021    
.5004 
0.427    
(0.495) 
.475 
    .501 
0.436    
0.497) 
         
Metro area  0.659    
0.475 
0.700  0.698    
(0.460) 
0.757    
0.430) 
Married  0.122   
(0.329) 
0.131    
(0.337) 
 
227.79   
(198.12) 





   
262.81   
(185.0823 
     
       
Max SSI benefit for unit in state 
 
189.69    
(131.35) 
267.40      
(197.09) 
267.21     
(201.082) 
Total HH income, excluding SSI  271.37     
(216.73) 
273.51     
259.702) 
Medicaid Recipient  0.980    
(0.140) 
     
     
0.706    
0.456  (0.461) 
         
0.156    
0.364 
0.114     
(0.318) 
0.124    
0.330) 
       
Social security income  174.01   
(133.85) 
223.70   
(191.79) 
240.59    
(199.50) 
228.23     
207.08) 
     
Any SS income  0.707  0.675  0.688 
(0.456)  (0.469)  (0.484) 
       
Expected SSI benefit, based on SS  187.19    
133.28 
247.3353    
166.5828 
269.15   
(197.68) 
318.95   
(215.93) 
   
Expected SSI benefit, based on all income  172.33    
(122.31) 
229.71    
(157.48) 
246.61   
(186.34) 
260    
(192.5848) 
238.31   
153.689) 
 
367.93     
(84.26) 
490.84    
(145.13) 
517.32    
(139.22) 
516.0982    
(94.633) 
571.91    
(146.43) 
       
SSI Income  259.25    
(178.04) 
302.41    
211.0912) 
         
196.27    
(140.58) 
243.33    
(222.27) 
271.73     
(245.72) 
1           1           1         1       
0   0     0       0 
   
Private health  0.088    
(0.284) 
0.056    
(0.230) 
0.065    
(0.247) 
0.054     
(0.227) 
0.149    
(0.356) 
   
  55Medicare helps pay  0.932     
(0.252) 
0.934     
(0.249) 
0.905    
(0.294) 
0.906    
(0.293) 
0.911    
(0.286) 
         
Food Stamp Benefits ($)  27.19   
(68.01) 
28.47   
(52.86) 
31.94    
(68.31) 
29.23    
(52.95) 
(89%)  (83%)  (84%)  (91%) 
 






0.279      
(0.449) 
0.322    
(0.468) 
 
0.864    
(0.344) 
0.857     
(0.351) 
0.817    
(0.388) 
0.886     
(0.318) 
22.22   
(45.90) 
         
% with Age at first app  183  236  333  184  151 
(75%) 
       
192  158  169 
(78%)  (84%) 
         
Poor health  0.517    
(0.501) 
0.311    
(0.464) 
0.292    
(0.456) 
       
SSI recipient categorically eligible for 
Medicaid in state 
0.805    
(0.397) 
 
  56TABLE A3:   
Descriptive Statistics by Eligibility and Take-Up Status by Year-in-Sample: Nonparticipating Eligibles  
 1984  1991  1993  1995  1997 
          
Nobs 176  412  207 
Couple unit  0.074 
(0.262)  0.300 
0.131 
0.325  0.303 
          
   
Female 0.807 
0.438  0.432 
 
74.13  73.87  73.48 
6.54 
Highest grade completed  8.19  8.98  10.09 
 
 
0.277  0.368  0.493 
 0.493  0.483  0.448 
 
0.729 
  0.422  0.442 
Married 0.227 
0.420  0.426  0.380 
    
352.11 
195.47  200.31 
      
0.866 
   
Expected SSI benefit, based on SS  137.70   
117.29 
180.95    
156.56 
197.13   
161.69 
157.34    
136.07 
      
  
SSI Income  1.72      0.391     0.736    
10.44 
          
Medicaid Recipient  0.114 
0.365 
 
248  201 
          
0.101  0.302  0.092  0.100 
  0.302  (0.290)  0.215 
          
In another's household  0.170  0.097  0.119  0.101 
 0.377  0.296  0.338 
white 0.705  0.645  0.772  0.736  0.686 
 0.458  0.479  0.420  0.442  0.465 
      
0.742  0.752  0.766  0.773 
 0.396  0.424  0.420 
        
age  75.03  74.76 
 6.67  6.52  6.44  6.16 
          
9.76  9.88 
4.03  3.91  3.50  3.98  6.14 
        
South 0.409  0.367 
0.484  0.501 
        
Metro area  0.716  0.770  0.745  0.736 
0.452  0.436  0.445 
          
0.246  0.238  0.204  0.174 
  0.432  0.404 
     
Social security income  246.27  317.95  350.60  340.24 
 144.74  178.25  196.40 
   
Receives any SS  0.864  0.879  0.891  0.821 
(0.344)  (0.327)  (0.312)  (0.342)  (0.384) 
      
176.61    
140.51 
208.30    
175.79 
          
Expected SSI benefit, based on all 
income 
109.16    
103.20 
142.14    148.8812    
141.560 
170.026    
143.94  126.89 
   
Max SSI benefit for unit in state  378.13    
89.71 
500.35   
152.09 
527.51    
150.37 
537.38   
107.92 
556.24    
104.69 
       
0.568      0.217    
2.53  7.54  19.97  5.76 
          
Total HH income, excluding SSI  298.19  
165.82 
426.28     
424.83 
461.88   
390.30 
622.21    
769.68 
404.15    
216.11 
0.157  0.100  0.134  0.222 
 0.318  0.300  0.342  0.417 
        
  57Private health  0.409  0.449  0.483  0.399  0.362 
 0.493  0.491  0.498  0.501  0.482 
Medicare helps pay  0.935  0.930  0.894 
 
   
12.68     
50.74 




   
39 
0.159  0.246 
  0.402  0.358 
0.444  0.323  0.344 
          
0.926  0.944 
0.262  0.246  0.230  0.255  0.309 
       
HH Food Stamp Benefits  5.65    
18.43504 
8.268657    
37.718 
8.613527    
34.4998 
         
% with Age at first app  76  106  48  62 
(43%)  (30%)  (26%)  (24%)  (30%) 
      
% with age at first pay  69  69  84  44 
(39%)  (28%)  (20%)  (19%)  (21%) 
Poor health  0.267  0.202  0.150 
0.444  0.367  0.432 
          
SSI recipient categorically eligible 
for Medicaid in state 
0.733 0.886  0.882  0.817  0.864 




  58TABLE A4:   
SSA Eligibility Decisions Among SSI Applicants, by Various Measures of Imputed Eligibility 
 
 
  Number who applied and were 
rejected 
 
Number who applied and were accepted 
into SSI program 
        
   
All respondent/years  




   
    
 
     
    
 
1125 
     
   
Imputed Eligible according to all 
income and assets (definition 1)  
   
 
(N = 2907)  68  768 
     
    





   
        
Imputed Eligible due to Social 




        





(N = 22,135)  357 




(N = 4338)  850 
 
Imputed Ineligible according to 
definition 2 
 
   
(N = 20,704)  135 
 
  59